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economy in 1982 
Enrique V. Iglesias* 
A review of what happened in the Latin American 
economies during 1982 is a particularly useful step 
towards understanding the nature and causes of the 
serious economic crisis affecting the region, knowledge 
of which in its turn is indispensable for proposing 
measures whereby to cope successfully with the 
situation. 
In the first part of the study, the author analyses 
the main features of the crisis in the light of certain 
key phenomena such as economic growth, unem-
ployment, inflation and external sector disequilibria, 
in particular the deterioration of the terms of trade, 
the increase in payments abroad under the head of 
interest and profit and the drastic reduction of the 
inflow of external capital. 
Both the gravity of the crisis and its causes vary 
according to the different national situations, but 
among those causes emphasis is laid in the second 
part of the article on the incidence of external fac-
tors, especially the contraction of the developed 
countries' demand for imports and the rise in inter-
est rates. The problems of external indebtedness are 
analysed in the third part, in which the author de-
scribes the situation towards the close of 1982 and 
expounds its root causes, in particular the prolonged 
international recession, the high cost of credit, the 
negative effects of development strategies based on 
external borrowing and the weaknesses of the inter-
national financial system. 
Lastly, the fourth part maps out the path that 
Latin America should follow in order to cope with 
the crisis, stressing the point that the solution will 
not be found through the application of the tradi-
tional austere stabilization policies, but must spring 
from the impulse given by steadfast economic reac-
tivation. This reactivation will not only necessitate a 
favourable policy on the part of the centres to 
promote international trade and facilitate payment 
of the Latin American countries' external debt, but 
will also have to be supported and spurred by 
renewed efforts at the level of co-operation among 
the countries of the region and with developing 
countries in other parts of the world. 
* Executive Secretary of ECLA. 
I 
Economic trends 
in Latin America 
during 1982 
In 1982 Latin America found itself in the 
throes of the worst economic crisis that had 
befallen it since the Second World War and, 
probably, the gravest since the dark years of 
the Great Depression. 
Caused by a complex set of external 
and internal factors, the crisis made itself 
felt in virtually all the main macroeconomic 
variables and affected, in different degrees, 
the great majority of the countries of the 
region. Thus, on the basis of the provisional 
data at ECLA's disposal, which are summa-
rized in table 1, it is estimated that: 
(i) Latin America's total gross domestic 
product fell by almost 1%, something that 
had not once occurred in the four preceding 
decades; 
(ii) As a result of this decrease and of 
population growth, the per capita product, 
which had already slightly declined in 1981, 
dropped by more than 3% in the region as a 
whole and underwent a contraction in each 
and all of the 19 countries for which compa-
rable data are available; 
(iii) In consequence of the further dete-
rioration suffered by the terms of trade in 
1982, the downward trend of total income 
was even steeper than that of the product, 
and the term s-of-trade index for the non-
petroleum-exporting countries sank to its 
lowest level in more than half a century; 
(iv) In addition, the loss of economic 
dynamism was accompanied by a rise in ur-
ban unemployment rates in the great major-
ity of the countries on which reliable data 
are to hand; 
(v) Notwithstanding all this, and above 
all as a result of the high exchange rates 
introduced in many countries, there was a 
notable quickening of the pace of inflation. 
The simple average rate of increase of con-
sumer prices exceeded 45% and the average 
weighted by the population was almost 80%. 
Thus, both far outstripped all those regis-
tered in the past; 
(vi) In the external sector, the balance 
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of payments, which had already displayed 
signs of weakness in the two preceding 
years, closed with an uprecedented deficit of 
about US$ 14 billion, with the consequent 
drain on international reserves; 
(vii) This negative balance occurred 
despite the volte-face performed by the 
merchandise trade balance, which, after 
showing a deficit of over US$ 600 million in 
1981, in 1982 generated a surplus of US$ 8.8 
billion; 
(viii) But the impact of this change in 
the t rade balance on the balance-of-
payments current account was largely neu-
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS* 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (billions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic 
product (1970 dollars) 
Short-term economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic 
product 
Consumer pricesc 
Terms of commodity 
trade 
Current value of exports 
of goods 
Current value of imports 
of goods 
External sector 
Exports of goods 
Imports of goods 
Commodity trade balance 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance-of-payments position 










































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
a
 Product and population figures relate to the group formed by the 19 countries included in table 2. Price data relate to the 
group formed by those 19 countries plus Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The figures for the exter-
nal sector relate to those 23 countries plus Suriname, except for the year 1982, in which Jamaica and Suriname 
are excluded. 
* Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
c
 Variation from December to December. 
<* Public external debt disbursed plus non-guaranteed debt to financial institutions which provide information to the 
Bank for International Settlements. 
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tralized by the sharp new upswing in net 
payments of profits and interest, which 
totalled more than US$ 34 billion, thus 
almost doubling in the course of only the 
last two years; 
(ix) In strong contrast with the increase 
in financial remittances abroad, the net 
inflow of capital into the region plummeted 
from US$ 42 billion in 1981 to US$ 19 200 
million in 1982; 
(x) As a result of this downward plunge, 
in 1982 there was a significant slackening of the 
growth rate of the total external debt, 
which, after increasing at an average rate of 
24% during the four preceding years, did so 
by only a little over 7% in 1982, and thus 
came to stand at approximately US$ 274 
billion by the end of the year; 
(xi) As at the same time, however, the 
value of exports of goods and services de-
creased, the relation between the amount of 
the debt and the value in question rose steeply, 
reaching a coefficient of 2.5, which easi-
ly surpassed the average of a little under 2 
recorded during the five preceding years. 
1. Economic growth 
The year 1982 witnessed a pronounced in-
tensification of the loss of dynamism which 
the Latin American economy had already-' 
shown in the previous year. After increasing 
by barely 1.5% in 1981 - i t s lowest growth 
rate since 1940- the region's gross domestic 
product decreased by almost 1% in 1982 
(see figure 1). 
Moreover, this decline in overall eco-
nomic activity - the first to take place in the 
past 43 years- was very widespread. As can 
be seen in table 2, the gross domestic prod-
uct shrank in 11 of the 19 countries con-
sidered, remained stagnant in two others and 
rose very slightly in the remaining six. But 
even in these last, the growth rate of the 
economy failed to keep pace with that of 
the population. Consequently, in 1982 some-
thing almost unheard-of happened: the per 
capita product decreased in all the countries 
of the region (see table 3). 
Economic activity contracted to a very 
marked extent in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa 
Rica and Uruguay, countries in which it had 
already declined in 1981. The worst slump, 
however, occurred in Chile, where tlie reces-
sion that had begun in 1981 was severely 
aggravated in 1982 and resulted in the re-
duction of the gross domestic product by 
about 13%. Economic activity also slack-
ened, although in a much more moderate 
degree, in all the Central American coun-
tries, except Panama, where it showed a 
marginal increase. The domestic product 
likewise decreased in Paraguay, the country 
which between 1975 and 1981 had attained 
the highest economic growth rate in Latin 
America. The boom in the Mexican econ-
omy which had started in 1978 also came 
to an abrupt halt in the course of 1982, 
while in Venezuela, the region's other lead-
ing petroleum exporter, economic activity 
remained almost completely static for the 
fourth year in succession. In contrast, total 
production in Brazil recovered a little during 
the year -although its expansion was not 
enough to offset its contraction in 1 9 8 1 -
and the gross domestic product very slowly 
increased in Colombia, Peru and the Domini-
can Republic. In these countries too, howev-
er, the growth rate of the economy was 
lower than that of the population, and in all 
of them, therefore, the per capita product 
slightly decreased. 
v
 f In Brazil - the largest economy in Latin 
America, which alone generates about one-
third of the region's total domestic product-
e c onomic activity increased by approxi-
mately 0.5%, after having declined in 1981 
-for the first time in the last 40 years- by 
2%. The main tonic influence behind this 
modest recovery was an expansion of about 
2% in manufacturing industry, a sector 
which from February onwards reversed the 
downward trend that it had followed 
throughout the whole of the year 1981, 
with the result that the industrial product in 
that year had undergone a contraction of 
nearly 10%. Thanks in part to this recovery 
in industrial activity, during the first nine 
months of the year unemployment rates 
were reduced in the country's six biggest 
cities (see table 4 and figure 2). 
As mentioned above, in 1982 there was 
a notable deterioration in the situation of 
the Mexican economy, which had been 
Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA: ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
1945 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates) 
Country 1970-1974 
1975-













































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
a
 Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
expanding with exceptional vigour since 
1978. In consequence of the acute external 
disequilibrium and of a considerable fall in 
international reserves, the economic authori-
ties first decided upon a severe devaluation 
of the Mexican peso and then imposed a 
strict exchange control. These measures 
helped to precipitate an exceptional accelera-
tion of the inflationary process and a drastic 
contraction of the volume of imports. In 
such circumstances, and also as a result of 
the cuts introduced in the public investment 
programme and of the uncertainty prevailing 
in the private sector, by half way through 
the year economic activity had begun to 
decline, and it is estimated that in the last 
few months unemployment and under-
employment significantly increased in the 
main urban centres. 
In Argentina - t h e third largest of the 
Latin American economies— the gross do-
mestic product decreased by about 5%, after 
having fallen by 6% in 1981. This further 
reduction was caused mainly by the slump 
in the construction sector and by the con-
traction which, for the third consecutive 
year, affected manufacturing industry. 
Owing to the decline in these activities -par-
ticularly marked during the first two quar-
ters of the year- and the downward trend 
shown by the sectors producing services, the 
rate of unemployment continued to rise 
both in Buenos Aires and in the primate 
cities of the interior. 
There was an even more notable drop 
in the gross domest ic product and 
unemployment soared yet more sharply in 
Chile and Uruguay, the other two economies 
12 CEPAL REVIEW No. 19 /April 1983 
Table 3 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
a
 At market prices. 
b Provisional estimates subject to revision. 
in the Southern Cone which, like Argentina, 
had in recent years pursued economic policies 
of a monetarist type. The decrease in 
economic activity was particularly marked in 
Chile, where it is estimated that the gross 
domestic product fell by about 13%, mainly 
in consequence of the steep downward trend 
followed by industrial production and the 
virtual collapse of the construction sector. 
This drastic contraction in economic activity 
caused, in its turn, a dramatic upswing in 
the rate of overt unemployment, which 
towards the end of the year hovered around 
25% in Greater Santiago (see table 4 and 
figure 2). 
The evolution of the economy was sim-
ilar, although less unfavourable, in Uru-
guay, a country in which the gross domestic 
product, after decreasing slightly in 1981, 
shrank by approximately 9.5% in 1982. As 
in Chile, its contraction was accompanied by 
an even more marked decline in industrial 
activity, by a severe depression in the con-
struction sector and by an aggravation of the 
unemployment situation. The rate of unem-
ployment in Montevideo, which between 1977 
and the beginning of 1981 had steadily fallen 
but which had begun to climb rapidly in the 
second quarter of that year, continued to 
increase in 1982 and exceeded 13% in 
October. 
Economic activity also declined at a 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
(Average annual rates) 
































































































Source: ECLA and PREALC, on the basis of official statistics. 
a
 Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires. Average from April to October. 1982: April. 
^Metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. Average for 12 
months. 1980: average for June to December. 1982: average for January to September. 
c
 Bogotá, Barranquilla, Mcdcllin and Cali. Average for March, June, September and December. 1974: June. 1982: average 
for March, June and September. 
« Urban. Average for March, July and November. 1976: Average for July and November. 1982: March. 
e
 Greater Santiago. Average for four quarters. 1982: Average from January to November, 
/ Metropolitan area of Mexico Gty, Guadalajara and Monterrey. Average for four quarters. 
S Asunción, Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo. 1981: first semester. 
*\ Metropolitan Lima. Averages calculated according to the data available for each year. 
1
 Montevideo. Average for two semesters. 1973: first semester. 1974: second semester. 1982: average for January to 
October. 
/ Urban. Average for two semesters. 1982: first semester. 
very high rate (-7.5%) in Bolivia, where it 
had stagnated completely in the two preced-
ing years. Although largely linked to the 
profound external crisis undergone by the 
country in 1982, and also to the explosive 
growth of inflation, this contraction of the 
gross domestic product likewise reflected the 
incidence of extra-economic factors. 
These latter also decisively influenced 
trends in economic activity in most of the 
Central American countries, in all of which, 
except Panama, the gross domestic product 
diminished in 1982. The most marked 
decreases took place in Costa Rica (-6%) - a 
country in which economic activity had 
already declined the year before, and which 
in 1982 began to adopt measures to control 
galloping inflation- and in El Salvador 
(—4.5%), where there was no respite from 
the bitter socio-political conflicts that had 
been partly responsible for a drop of about 
20% in the gross domestic product during 
the two preceding years. 
In the course of 1982 economic ac-
tivity also contracted —by approximately 
2.5%— in Paraguay, and thus a break 
occurred in the phase of exceptional dyna-
mism which had stretched from 1973 to 
1980, and during which the gross domestic 
product had grown at an average annual rate 
of something over 9%. 
On the other hand, economic activity 
increased, although at unsatisfactory rates, in 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and the Dominican 
Republic. In the first of these countries, the 
year 1982 saw an accentuation of the 
systematic loss of dynamism that the econ-
omy had been showing since 1979. While 
the gross domestic product increased by 
barely 1.5% - the lowest growth rate record-
ed in the last 40 years-, the rise in the rate 
of o vert unemployment averaged rather 
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Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICA: UNEMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN PRIMATE CITIES 
(Unemployment rates / 
% % 
10 | — i 10 
Río de Janeiro 
Capital and Greater Buenos Aires 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 j 2 3 4J 2 3 4 1_2 3_4_ l_2 3 4 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
more than 9% in the country's four primate 
cities. 
The economy evolved on similar lines 
in Ecuador, where the increment of approxi-
mately 2% registered in the gross domestic 
product in 1982 represented, firstly, a con-
tinuation of the downward trend followed 
by the rate of economic growth since 1979, 
and constituted, secondly, the lowest increase 
in economic activity measured since 1951. 
In 1982 the rate of economic expansion also 
declined in Peru. After climbing at an aver-
age annual rate of 4% in the three preceding 
years, the gross domestic product rose by 
barely 1% in 1982. 
Lastly, in 1982 the Cuban economy 
too made much slower headway, although, 
just as in 1981, its growth rate was the 
highest in the region. It is estimated that the 
material product (equivalent to the gross 
output of the agricultural, mining, manufac-
turing industry, construction and electric 
energy sectors) increased by 2.5%, after doing 
so by about 12% the year before. 
2. Inflation 
Although, as has been shown, in 1982 the 
rate of economic growth slackened and 
unemployment rose, inflation soared to an 
unprecedented height. The weighted average 
rate of increase of consumer prices in the 
region as a whole was almost 80%, and thus 
far exceeded the corresponding figure for 
any preceding year. While inflation increased 
in 13 of the 21 countries for which data are 
available, its acceleration was especially rapid 
in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Mexico 
(see table 5). 
As can be seen in figure 3, the rate of 
increase of consumer prices shot up in 
Argentina, reaching over 200% per annum in 
November. This phenomenon, mainly linked 
to the fiscal deficit and to the sharp devalua-
tions of the peso, meant that for the seventh 
time in the last 8 years inflation in Argenti-
na rose to a three-digit figure. 
The speed at which inflation advanced 
was even greater in Bolivia, where consumer 
prices, after mounting at a rate of about 
25% in the two preceding years, soared by 
over 200% in 1982. This vertical upward 
trend in the rate of inflation -which can be 
seen particularly clearly in figure 3 - was 
triggered by the rise of approximately 75% 
in the official rate of exchange decreed at 
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Figure 3 
SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: VARIATIONS IN 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX OVER TWELVE MONTHS 
I i i I I I M l I I 1 I I 1 _LLLi_LLi-LJ . J_i_i .-LLi.Xi J. .L i 
J F MA M I J A S 0_N_D j M j A M J I A S O N D J F M A M H A S O N l j 
1980 1981 1982 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
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Source: International Monetary l-'und, International Financial Statistics, November 1982, and official data provided by the countries concerned. 
a
 Totals for Latin America and partial figures fur groups of countries represent average variations by countries, weighted by the population in each 
. year, 
''Variation between November 1982 and November 1981. 
c Up to 1979, figures correspond to the variation in the Rio de Janeiro Consumer Trice Index and from 1980 onwards to the variations in the total na-
tional CP1. 
'/Variation between October 1982 and October 1981. 
e
 Up to 1980, figures represent the variation in the Consumer Price Index for manual workers; 1981 and 1982, figures represent the 
variation in the total national CP1, for both manual workers and employees. 
/ Variation between August 1982 and August 1981. 
S Variation between September 1982 and September 1981, 
h
 Variation between June 1982 and June 1981. 
' Variation between July 1982 and July 1981. 
the beginning of February, and constituted, 
together with the brusque fall in the gross 
domestic product and external payments 
difficulties, an outward and visible sign of 
the deep-seated crisis suffered by the 
Bolivian economy in 1982. 
In Mexico, too, the acceleration of 
inflation was very marked. In this country, 
which up to 1972 had kept its price levels 
remarkably stable, the rate of inflation had 
subsequently hovered between 15% and 
30%, and then rocketed after the devalua-
tion of the Mexican peso in February. Thus, 
by the end of November the annual rate of 
increase of consumer prices approached 85%, 
and in view of the big increases in the prices 
of a number of goods and services decreed at 
the beginning of December, it was probably 
even higher at the end of the year. 
In Costa Rica -another country which 
has traditionally maintained an appreciable 
degree of stability, but in which the rate of 
inflation went up by leaps and bounds at 
the beginning of 1981 in consequence of the 
successive devaluations of the colon-, the 
rate of inflation continued to accelerate up 
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to September, when it reached the unprece-
dented level of almost 110%. Despite the 
fact that this rising trend in inflation was 
interrupted in October, at the end of that 
month the level of consumer prices was 
exactly twice as high as it had been a year 
before. 
In Brazil, the rate of inflation con-
tinued to fluctuate slightly below 100% for 
the second year in succession. This result 
was decisively influenced by the complex 
system of indexation of the exchange rate, 
salaries and wages, financial assets, and other 
key e c o n omic variables, which bred a 
marked tendency towards perpetuation of 
the inflationary process. Inflation followed a 
similar course, although at a lower level, in 
Peru, where again a system had been consol-
idated in recent years which was character-
ized by frequent readjustment of the ex-
change parity and of salaries and wages, and 
where consumer prices rose in 1982 by more 
than 70%, just as in the preceding year. 
Fu r the rmore , in mid-1982 the 
downward trend which had been almost con-
tinuously followed by Chilean inflation since 
1974 was reversed. After a fall in price levels 
in absolute terms during the first half of the 
year, there was a vigorous recrudescence of 
inflation as a result of the alteration of the 
exchange rate, which had been pegged dur-
ing the three preceding years. In conse-
quence of this devaluation and of the subse-
quent successive increases in the exchange 
parity, notwithstanding the freezing of sal-
aries and wages and the contraction of the 
money supply, the annual rate of increase of 
consumer prices rose steadily from June 
onwards and reached 20% by the end of 
November, while that of wholesale prices 
exceeded 36%. 
In contrast with the experience of the 
foregoing countries, the rate of inflation 
declined a little -from 27.5% in 1981 to 
25% in 1982- in Colombia, a country in 
which annual price variations have shown a 
notable degree of stability during the last 10 
years, fluctuating almost permanently 
between 25% and 30%. 
Inflation also continued to slow down 
in Uruguay. The annual rate of increase of 
consumer prices, which had dropped from 
83% in 1979 to 43% in 1980 and to 30% in 
1981, fell to less than 11% in November 
1982. It is highly likely, however, that this 
downward trend may have been reversed in 
December in consequence of the abrupt rise 
in the exchange rate decreed at the end of 
November. 
Again, among countries in which the 
rate of inflation has traditionally been mod-
erate and for some of which no data are 
available on the more recent months, the 
rate of increase of consumer prices rose 
slightly from 23% to 26% in Nicaragua and 
from 18% to 20% in Ecuador; declined for 
the third consecutive year in Trinidad and 
Tobago and Venezuela; remained relatively 
stable in Barbados, EI Salvador, Jamaica, 
Haiti, Panama and the Dominican Republic; 
went up sharply, although from a very low 
level, in Honduras; and was markedly re-
duced in Guyana, Paraguay, and, above all, 
Guatemala (see table 5). 
3. The external sector 
Under the severe constraints imposed by the 
adverse evolution of the world economy 
(which will be discussed later) and by the 
adjustment policies applied in many coun-
tries of the region, in 1982 Latin America's 
external sector underwent a radical upheaval, 
of which the following were the most signifi-
cant manifestations: 
(i) The value of exports of goods 
decreased by 10% after six years of very 
rapid expansion; 
(ii) The decline was much steeper still 
-19%- in the case of the value of imports, 
which had also been increasing at a high rate 
since 1975; 
(iii) These changes made a very con-
siderable difference to the merchandise trade 
balance, which switched from a deficit of 
somewhat over US$ 600 million in 1981 to a 
surplus of more than US$ 8.8 billion in 1982; 
(iv) This volte-face in merchandise trade 
was achieved despite a 77o deterioration in 
the terms of trade; 
(v) During the year 1982 net payments 
of profits and interest continued to rise at a 
dizzy speed, and reached over USS 34 
billion, an amount equivalent to almost 
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40% of the value of exports of goods and 
nearly double that of the net financial 
remit tances transferred only two years 
before; 
(vi) As a result of the merchandise 
trade surplus, and notwithstanding the con-
siderable increase in net payments of profits 
and interest, the deficit on current account, 
which had been growing steadily larger since 
1976, was reduced from US$ 38 billion in 
1981 to US$33 billion in 1982; 
(vii) This decline was accompanied, 
however, by a much more drastic decrease in 
the net movement of capital, which fell by 
55%, dropping from US$ 44 billion in 1981 
to only a little over US$ 19 billion in 1982 -
the lowest figure in the last five years; 
(viii) In consequence of this contrac-
tion, despite the reduction of the imbalance 
on current account, the balance-of-payments 
position underwent a radical change, a 
surplus of nearly US$ 4 billion in 1981 
giving place to a deficit of about US$ 14 
billion in 1982 (see table 6). 
(a) Foreign trade and terms of trade 
In 1981 there was a break in the pro-
longed and rapid expansion of Latin Amer-
ica's exports which had been going on since 
the beginning of the previous decade. After 
increasing at an average annual rate of 19% 
between 1970 and 1981, the value of ex-
ternal sales of goods dropped by 10% in 
1982. 
This diminution, however was caused 
exclusively by t h e r educ t ion in the 
unit value of exports, which not only de-
creased by 10% in the region as a whole but 
declined in all the Latin American countries 
(see table 7). 
So generalized a downward movement 
reflected, in its turn, the impact of the fall 
in world market prices for the great majority 
of the primary commodities exported by the 
region, which were adversely affected not 
only by the contraction of demand due to 
the recession in the industrialized economies 
and the rise in interest rates, but also by the 
appreciation of the dollar on international 
exchange markets. 
Al though during 1982 reductions 
occurred in the world market prices of 
virtually all the principal primary commod-
ities exported by Latin America, they were 
particularly heavy in the prices of sugar 
(which dropped by over 40% for a second 
consecutive year), in those of fish meal, lead 
and maize (which decreased by between 20% 
and 25%) and in those of copper, cocoa, 
soya and zinc (which fell by between 10% and 
15%). In fact, bananas, coffee and iron ore 
were the only products whose prices rose in 
1982, but these increases were minimal, and 
both in the case of coffee and in that of 
iron were far from offsetting the sharp 
decline in the preceding years (see table 8 
and figure 4). 
The sluggishness of international trade 
also exerted an unfavourable influence on 
the volume of Latin American exports. The 
latter had steadily kept up an exceptionally 
high average annual rate of expansion 
- 8 . 7 % - between 1976 and 1981, but in 
1982 remained completely static. However, 
in contrast with the decline in unit value 
which, as has been seen, reflected to a 
greater or lesser degree the decreases in all 
countries' export prices, stability in the 
quantum of exports was the net result of 
the opposing trends it showed in the various 
economies of the region. Thus, while the 
volume of exports shrank by about 10% in 
Brazil, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Uruguay, and contracted even more notably 
in Venezuela (-17%) and Guyana (-24%), it 
expanded by approximately 14% in Peru, 
Barbados and Chile, by over 20% in Mexico 
tnd by about. 30% in Paraguay. 
The change in relation to the trends 
prevailing in previous years was yet more 
marked in the case of imports, whose value 
dropped by 19%, after a spell of vigorous 
and uninterrupted growth between 1980 and 
1981. As can be seen in table 9, this 
downward movement affected alike both the 
group formed by the petroleum-exporting 
countries and that constituted by the other 
economies of the region. 
Moreover, contrary to what happened 
in the case of exports, the decline in the 
value of external purchases was caused 
mainly by the reduction of their quantum. 
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Source: 1981: International Monetary Fund; the figures for Barbados, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic and Uruguay are EC LA estimates. 1982: ECLA, provisional estimates sub-
ject to revision. 
a
 Additions and subtractions do not exactly fit the totals owing to rounding of the original figures. 
b
 Excluding net payments of profits and interest. 
c
 Including net unilateral private transfers. 
^Including long-and short-term capital, unilateral official transfers, counterpart entries and errors and omissions. 
e
 Corresponds to the variation in international reserves. 
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Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS OF GOODS 













































































































































































































































































Source: ECLA. Provisional estimates. 
and decreased in 12 of the 22 countries for 
which data are available. The slump in the 
volume of imports was exceptionally pro-
nounced in Argent ina (-50%), Chile 
(-39%), Mexico (-38%) and Bolivia (-31%), 
all of them count r ies which heavily 
devalued their currencies in the course of 
1982 and in which economic activity under-
went a marked decline or lapsed almost 
completely into stagnation. The quantum of 
imports likewise fell by more than 20% in 
Uruguay, Costa Rica, Guyana and Nicaragua, 
owing to the measures adopted to reduce 
the external imbalance and to the contrac-
tion of the domestic product. On the other 
hand, in Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, 
Barbados and Colombia imports of goods 
increased rapidly in real terms. 
As in the case of exports, in 1982 the 
unit value of imports decreased; nevertheless, 
this downturn was much more moderate 
than that of the average price of exports. 
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Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: PRICES OF STAPLE EXPORT PRODUCTS 













































































































































































































































Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, Supplements 1960-1980 and November 1982; International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, Yearbooks 1981 and November 1982. 
January to September. 
b
 U.S. cents. 
c
 Dollars per ton. 
<* Dollars per pound. 
Accordingly, the terms of trade, which had 
already deteriorated by 7% in 1981, under-
went a further decline of 6% in 1982. 
This reduction, moreover, was wide-
spread. In 1982 the terms of trade deterio-
rated in all the countries of the region with 
the exception only of Colombia, El Salva-
dor, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Venezuela, where they slightly 
improved (see table 10). 
In striking contrast with what had 
occurred in previous years, in 1982 the de-
cline in the terms of trade was more marked 
(-12%) in the petroleum-exporting countries 
than in the other economies of the region 
(-4%) (see table 10 and figure 5). Even so, 
the negative effects of the deterioration were 
worse in the latter, since in these countries 
the terms of trade had already been con-
tinuously following a steep downward trend 
during the four preceding years. Accord-
ingly, the terms-of-trade index for the non-
petroleum-exporting countries sank in 1982 
to its lowest level in more than half a cen-
tury and its average value over the three-year 
period 1980-1982 was considerably less than 
it had been in the years 1931-1933, i.e., 
during the most critical phase of the Great 
Depression. 
(b) The balance of payments 
Since a much greater reduction took 
place in the value of imports than in that of 
expor ts , the merchandise trade balance 
underwent a radical change in 1982. In the 
region as a whole a surplus of US$ 8.8 
bi l l ion replaced the defici t of over 
US$ 600 million shown in the preceding year. 
This right-about turn was particularly 
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Figure 4 
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS OVER 12 MONTHS IN INTERNATIONAL PRICES OF MAIN 
COMMODITIES EXPORTED, 1980 - 1982 
UNREFINED SUGAR BANANAS 
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Figure 4 (continued) 
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Figure 4 (concluded) 
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Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, November 1982. Petroleum: IMF, 
International Financial Statistics, December 1982. 
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Table 9 
LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS OF GOODS 















































































































































































































































































Source: ECLA. Provisional estimates. 
influenced by the considerable changes 
occurring in the merchandise trade balances 
of Mexico (which after having a deficit of 
US$ 3.3 billion in 1981 obtained a surplus 
of US$6.9 billion in 1982), Chile (where a 
small surplus of US$ 150 million replaced 
the negative balance of US$ 2.6 billion re-
corded the year before), and Argentina 
(which increased the positive balance it had 
achieved in 1981 by US$ 2.2 billion). In 
contrast, in 1982 the trade balance surplus 
that Venezuela had secured in 1981 was 
reduced by US$ 4.9 billion and that of 
Brazil decreased by US$ 700 million (see 
table 6). 
The effects on the balance on current 
account of this reversal in merchandise trade 
and of the US$ 3 billion decrease in net 
service payments in 1982 were neutralized, 
however, to a considerable extent, by the 
new and substantial increase in net remit-
tances of profits and interest. Although the 
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Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE AND PURCHASING POWER 
OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 
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Source: ECLA. Provisional estimates. 
contraction in domestic economic activity 
helped to limit remittances of profits, and 
notwithstanding the decline in nominal in-
terest rates on the international financial 
markets, payments of profits and interest 
rose from a little less than US$ 27 billion in 
1981 to over US$ 34 billion in 1982. As 
these remittances had already been increas-
ing exceptionally fast since 1977, the 
amount they represented in 1982 more than 
quadrupled the corresponding figure shown 
barely five years before. 
The net result of these changes was a 
reduction of USS 5 billion in Latin America's 
deficit on current account. Although this 
decrease was the first that had occurred 
since 1976, the negative balance on current 
account in 1982 easily exceeded all those 
recorded up to 1980. 
In consonance with the changes in mer-
Figure 5 
LATIN AMERICA: TRENDS OF SOME FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
(Indexes: 1970 = 100) 
PETROLEUM-EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
Terms of trade in goods. 
__ Purchasing power of exports of goods. 
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chandise trade and in the net inflow of 
capital, the large negative balances with 
which the current account had closed the 
preceding year in Mexico, Chile and Argenti-
na were drastically reduced in 1982, while 
there was a marked increase in the deficits 
shown by Brazil and Colombia and a radical 
reversal took place in Venezuela's current 
account, which, after generating a surplus of 
US$ 4 billion in 1981, recorded a deficit of 
US$ 2.2 billion in 1982. 
Furthermore, as a result of the unfa-
vourable economic trends observable in the 
great majority of the countries of the region, 
of the very high level of external indebt-
edness reached by many of them, and of the 
changes in the world economy,1 in 1982 
there was a brusque contraction in net 
movements of capital into Latin America. 
Net receipts of external resources decreased, 
in fact, by 55%, falling from US$ 42 billion 
More than at any other time since the 
Second World War, the growth of the 
periphery in general and of Latin America in 
particular was heavily conditioned in 1982 
by constraints deriving from the poor eco-
nomic evolution of the centre. It is true 
that, as already shown, causes of internal 
origin —such as those linked to the unsatis-
factory management of fiscal and exchange 
policies and to problems of an extra-eco-
nomic character- account for most of the 
big decreases in the product in the countries 
of the Southern Cone, for its decline in 
several Central American economies or for 
the stagnation of economic activity in coun-
tries such as Mexico. Nevertheless, the major 
ex te rnal constraints stemming from the 
recession in the industrialized economies 
constituted a brake which had a generalized 
1
 These last two factors are discussed in greater detail 
in the next two sections. 
in 1981 to only a little over US$ 19 billion 
in 1982. 
This decline in net movements of loans 
and investment was, moreover, much more 
pronounced than the decrease in the deficit 
on current account. Consequently, during 
1982 a sweeping change occurred in the 
final balance-of-payments position. In 1981 
the balance of payments had generated a 
surplus of nearly US$ 4 billion; in 1982 it 
showed a deficit of about US$ 14 billion. 
Although this result was especially due to 
the very substantial deficits which Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela recorded in 1982, 
and to the smaller, but still appreciable, 
negative balances shown by Chile, Colombia 
and Uruguay, all the countries of the region 
also contributed to it, the only exceptions 
being Trinidad and Tobago, Peru and El Sal-
vador, which obtained small surpluses. 
handicapping effect on the economic growth 
of the entire region. 
Although the anti-inflation campaign 
waged in many of the member countries of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) succeeded in 
significantly lowering the rate of inflation in 
1982, it did so only at the cost of a new 
rise in the rate of unemployment and an 
almost total stagnation of economic activity. 
According to provisional! estimates, the gross 
domestic product of the OECD economies as 
a whole would seem to have shown an 
increase of barely 0.1%, whereby they 
completed three successive years of ex-
tremely low growth rates (see table 11). This 
had a negative effect on the centre's demand 
for imports, the value of which decreased by 
nearly 4% in 1982. Moreover, although in 
that same year the nominal interest rate fell 
by three percentage points, inflation in the 
OECD countries was reduced on a similar 
scale, so that the real rate of interest con-
II 
The incidence of external factors 
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Table 11 
SOME BASIC INTERNATIONAL INDICATORS 
OECD countries 
Annual growth rate of GDP 
Annual inflation^ 
Average rate of unemployment 




Annual growth rate of GDP 


















































Source: United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs; IMF, International Financial Statistics 
(several issues); OECD, Main Economic Indicators, September 1982; and ECLA estimates, on the basis of official 
statistics. 
a
 Provisional estimates. 
* Consumer price index. 
c LIBOR at 6 months. 
<* LIBOR at 6 months deflated by the rate of inflation of the OECD countries. 
tinued to stand at approximately 6%, its 
highest level since the Great Depression.2 
This, of course, played a contributory part 
in limiting the expansion of demand and 
deferring the first steps towards a recovery 
of the central economies. 
The most serious feature of the year 
1982, however, was not so much the re-
cession in the centre, nor the decline in 
world trade, nor the high real rates of in-
terest - for in the past there had been pe-
As will be seen later, the real rate of interest on the 
Latin American countries' external debt was much higher 
still, since in 1982 the unit value of Latin America's exports 
sharply declined. 
riods of similar or even worse contractions-
but the coincidence of all these negative 
phenomena in a single year and, above all, 
their prolonged duration. 
While the recession in the industrialized 
economies in 1974-1975 was more critical 
than i ts counterpart today - the gross 
domestic product of the OECD countries fell 
by 1% in that period- it lasted only two 
years. Thus, as can be seen in table 11, in 
1976 there was already a vigorous recovery of 
p r o d u c t i o n (4 .9%), so t ha t in the 
three-year period 1974-1976 the cumulative 
growth rate of the central economies was 
almost 4%. On the other hand, while in the 
course of the period 1980-1982 production 
never decreased in the OECD countries as a 
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Table 12 
SOME BASIC EXTERNAL SECTOR INDICATORS 
(Percentage variations during the period) 
Value of OECD imports 
Volume of OECD imports 
Value of the dollar 
(+: appreciation; —: depreciation) 
Commodity prices» 






































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (several issues); and ECLA estimates, on the basis of official statistics. 
a
 Excluding petroleum. 
whole, its total increase was only 2.7%, that 
is, less than in the period 1974-1976. 
In short, 1982 was the third con-
secutive year of meagre growth in the 
centre; the second year in which real interest 
rates fluctuated around 6%; and the third 
successive year in which OECD's volume of 
imports decreased or only marginally ex-
panded. Consequently, 1982 was also a year 
in which the prices of the primary commod-
ities produced by the periphery fell, and the 
fifth consecutive year in which the terms of 
trade deteriorated for the non-petroleum-
exporting developing countries (see table 
12). 
To this set of unfavourable circum-
stances was added yet another of particular 
significance, i.e., the marked reduction in 
absolute terms of the net flow of capital 
into the periphery. This decline was es-
pecially severe in the case of the non-
petroleum-exporting countries of Latin 
America, whose net receipts of capital 
dropped by 35% in 1982 (see table 13). 
This contraction in net capital inflows 
was crucial, since it is the capital account, of 
course, which can be used as a buffer against 
abrupt deteriorations of the trade balance 
without bringing down the product and 
income. In fact, it was thanks to these cap-
ital inflows, which in 1974-1975 acted as a 
countercyclical factor, that Latin America 
was able to maintain a by no means neg-
ligible economic growth rate throughout that 
period, despite the severe recession which 
was affecting the central economies at the 
time. But in lively contrast with what 
occurred during the 1974-1975 crisis, in 
1982 the capital movements in question 
played a procyclica! role. 
This situation was linked, in turn, to the 
unexpected duration of the recession in the 
centre. Its prolongation, and the repeated 
postponement of the first signs of recovery 
beyond the looked-for date, brought about a 
liquidity crisis in the industrialized econ-
omies which made itself felt in an upsurge 
of demand for credit, Which was no longer 
due to the prevalence of inflationary ex-
pectations -since, as already shown, the rate 
of inflation had decreased- but stemmed 
from the need to supplement the low cash 
32 CEPAL REVIEW No. 19 I April 1983 
Table 13 
FLOWS OF CAPITAL AND VOLUME OF EXPORTS OF NON-PETROLEUM 
EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 




2. Volume of exports of 
A11NPEDC& 
Latin America 
3. Ratio between flows of 
capital and volume 








































































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (several issues), ana Annual Report 1982; and ECLA estimates. 
0
 Net flow of capital in current dollars deflated by the United States CPI. 
° Non-petroleum-exporting developing countries. 
flows caused by the continuous and 
unexpected reduction of sales. As this heavy 
demand for credit coincided with stabi-
l ization policies centering on monetary 
restrictions, it generated unprecedented real 
interest rates and led to declines in pro-
duction, particularly in the sectors most 
sensitive to the rate of interest (such as 
those producing capital goods and durable 
consumer goods), and to reductions in in-
ventories. 
Unfortunately, primary commodities 
-which constitute the periphery's staple ex-
ports— are among the goods in whose case 
adjustment to a contraction in demand is 
made mainly through a fall in prices, or else 
they constitute inputs for industries that are 
particularly hard hit by a recession in the 
centre (for example, metal products for the 
motor vehicle and construction industries), 
or again their inventories are liable to be 
drastically reduced when the rate of interest 
rises. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 
the last two years they have suffered a price 
decline of 30%. 
Viewed from this angle, the persistence 
of deflationary policies in the centre has 
especially affected the periphery's export 
prices but only partly hit domestic prices in 
the centre itself. Consequently, downward 
price rigidity as regards the goods produced 
in the industrialized countries has aggravated 
the deterioration of the periphery's terms of 
trade. 
Of course, there is nothing new about 
the fact that stabilization policies applied in 
the central economies are more prone to 
bring down the periphery's terms of trade 
than to reduce inflation in the centre. What 
is new is that because of the unexpected 
prolongation of the recession a liquidity 
crisis occurred which kept real interest rates 
exceptionally high - i n contrast with what 
happened in 1974-1975, when the real in-
terest rate was negative- and which also 
made for restriction of the net flow of cap-
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ital into the periphery, a circumstance that 
likewise implied a significant difference from 
what had occurred during the 1974-1978 
crisis and again in 1980. 
Indeed, in the latter year the flow of 
capital into the non-petroleum-exporting 
countries of the periphery increased by over 
10% and helped to neutralize the impact of 
the deterioration in the terms of trade 
deriving from the second petroleum crisis 
and the recession in the centre. With the 
persistence of this situation in 1981, the net 
flow of capital again increased, although by 
barely more than 2%. In 1982, on the other 
hand, the net flow of capital to the non-
petroleum-exporting countries of the pe-
riphery not only failed to rise but decreased 
in absolute terms (see table 13). 
This decline was partly due to the high 
levels of indebtedness reached by the de-
veloping countries and to the slower ex-
pansion of bank capital, and partly too to 
the reluctance of the international banking 
system to increase its loans to the periphery 
at a time when the value of the latter's 
exports was diminishing. 
The perverse irony of this change lies in 
the fact that the reduction in the value of 
the periphery's exports was due not to a 
contraction in their volume -which in fact 
expanded— but to the very marked fall in 
e x p o rt prices. Thus, since the banking 
system took as the index of the periphery's 
capacity of payment the current value of its 
exports -and not their future value, which 
would incorporate more normal terms of 
trade-, capital movements tended to ag-
gravate rather than to alleviate the external 
crisis. 
Consequently, in the period 1980-1982 
the net inflow of capital into Latin America 
seriously decreased (-28%), while the 
volume of the region's exports expanded by 
16% (see table 13). 
Thus, in contrast to what happened in 
the two-year period 1974-1975 -when the 
inflow of capital increased much more than 
the volume of exports, thus allowing the 
periphery time to weather the petroleum 
shock and the international recession 
without suffering a contraction of its own-, 
after 1979 the flow of capital remained 
static in relation to exports or abruptly 
declined, compelling the non-petroleum-
exporting peripheral countries to reduce the 
balance-of-payments deficit through the 
current account rather than through the 
capital account. 
As has already been shown, a large 
number of the countries of the region tried 
to improve their trade balance in 1982 
through severe devaluations of their cur-
rencies, which helped to boost the volume 
of their exports; but much of this effort 
came to nothing on account of the fall in 
prices. And this was so because the capacity 
to absorb new imports both on the part of 
the centre and on that of non-traditional 
purchasers such as the petroleum-exporting 
countries and the socialist countries, de-
creased or grew far more slowly during that 
same year. 
Consequently, given, in the first place, 
the limited capacity of the rest of the world 
to absorb the bigger volume of exports of 
the periphery as a whole without its imply-
ing a fall in the export prices concerned; 
given, in the second place, the increase in 
debt services; and given, lastly, the pro-
cyclical character of thei net flow of capital 
in 1982, the necessary adjustment on 
current account had to be effected by a 
reduction of the peripheral countries' imports, 
which, in turn, entailed a decline or a pro-
nounced deceleration in the growth rate of 
their production. 
Thus the vicious circle of the liquidity 
crisis was completed. Tl^ e year 1982 saw a 
deterioration of all those mechanisms of 
adjustment to a recessior in the centre which 
do not oblige the periphery to curtail its 
production, such as an expansion of the 
volume of its exports to countries other 
than those of the centjre which might be 
growing rapidly (as were the OPEC econ-
omies in the mid-1970s); a fall in internation-
al rates of interest (with the consequent 
reduction of debt service payments and an 
increase in commodity export volumes so as 
to replace and expand inventories); or a 
larger flow of capital into the periphery. 
In these circumstances, there was 
no way open but the bast desired and de-
sirable form of adjustment: a curtailment of 
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production. In face of this situation, which 
was sometimes aggravated yet further by the 
neo-protectionist trends in the centre, it is 
not surprising that in 1982 several develop-
ing countries fell into arrears in their ex-
ternal payments and that many of them 
applied for renegotiation of their external 
debt. For if the value of their exports de-
1. The situation in 1982 
As already stated, provisional estimates 
suggest that the total external indebtedness 
of Latin America increased by somewhat 
more than 7% in 1982, thus amounting to 
US$ 274 billion (see table 14). This ex-
pansion represented a marked deceleration 
by comparison with the previous growth 
rates, which had been well over 20% a year 
since 1977. 
The reduction in the rate of debt 
accumulation was much more notable in the 
region's net petroleum-exporting countries 
than in the petroleum-importing countries, 
since in the former the rate fell from 32% in 
1981 to 5% in 1982, while the comparable 
rates in the latter case were 17% and 10% 
for those two years. 
This slowing-down of debt accumula-
tion in 1982 cannot of course be considered 
to have been brought about on purpose. It 
was undoubtedly due to the more burden-
some loan terms, the uncertainty with regard 
to the exchange rate in many countries and 
unfavourable changes in interest rates. 
However, the decisive factor in the decelera-
tion in 1982 was the same that had helped 
to create much of the dynamism of external 
financing in the 1970s -the availability of 
funds from international private commercial 
banks. 
The share of the banks in the region's 
external indebtedness has of course increased 
notably: in the 1960s it was relatively in-
significant, while in the 1980s it was 
over 50%, and in some countries (Argentina, 
creases because of the recession in the centre 
and if capital flows are reduced because 
export values decline, then the whole of the 
adjustment must be absorbed either by re-
duction of imports (largely induced by a 
contraction in domestic economic activity) 
and/or by the negotiation of new conditions 
of payment of the external debt. 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela) it amounted 
to more than two-thirds of the total debt. 
Obviously, debts with private banks 
reached these proportions because of the 
willingness of the banks in question to fi-
nance most of the region's deficit on current 
account from 1974 on. In actual fact, bank 
loans have been available in abundance, 
except during a short recession in the 
mid-1970s. Recently, however, the banks 
have become much more cautious about 
making new commitments in general and 
particularly in respect of granting loans to 
the developing countries. 
Many factors are responsible for this 
tighter attitude on the part of the commer-
cial external credit institutions. In the first 
place, the cyclical decline in the industrial 
economies has weakened the bank markets 
in their countries of origin, causing national 
clients to meet with payments difficulties or 
to go bankrupt, while at the same time in-
creasing the demand for credit; moreover, 
many of the banks' clients in developing 
countries have experienced payments 
problems. Other factors accounting for the 
banks' lack of interest in granting loans to 
developing countries include a more general-
ized attitude of circumspection concerning 
the diversification of their portfolios and 
disequilibria in the relation between their 
capital and their assets. 
The payments problems of the develop-
ing countries with regard to the private 
banks have been especially apparent in Latin 
America. In 1982 there were serious 
payments crises in Mexico and Argentina 
III 
The problems of external indebtedness 
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Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT DISBURSED0 











































































































































































































Source: ECLA, on basis of the following publications: IBRD, World Debt Tables. External Public Debt of Developing 
Countries and Territories, December 1981, provisional figures; IBRD, Economic Memorandum on Suriname, 
Report N° 2851, 30 May 1980; IDB: External Public Debt of the Latin American Countries, July 1981;BIS, The 
Maturity Distribution of International Bank Lending, July 1978, July 1979, July .1980, July 1981 and July 
1982; IMF, International Financial Statistics, vol. XXXIV, August 1981; OECD: Development Co-operation, 
1977 Review, 1978 Reviewj OECD: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 
Paris, 1980. 
a
 Including, in addition to the officially guaranteed public and private external debt, the; non-guaranteed long and 
short-term debt to financial institutions which provide information to the Bank for International Settlements, and credits 
from the International Monetary Fund. The guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt to other commercial banks is not 
included, and neither are suppliers' credits not officially guaranteed. ' 
^Provisional ECLA estimates, based on the estimated movement of the pertinent balance-of-payments items. For this 
reason, they may not coincide with the estimates presented respecting the amount of some countries* to tal external debt. 
c
 In the case of financial centre, the non-publicly-guaranteed short-term debt to financial institutions is not included. 
- w h i c h are among the leading bank such as Cuba and Venezuela, have an-
debtors- and also in Bolivia, Ecuador, and nounced that they will try to reschedule 
Costa Rica. In addition, other countries, their next payments; and although some 
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Table 15 
LATIN AMERICA: EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT INDICATORS* 
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Debt coefficients (percentages) 
15 16 20 28 29 
182 210 197 
24 30 
55 54 48 55 59 73 95 81 
124 147 131 113 128 
186 210 250 
Source: Public debt: World Bank, World Debt Tables. 
Total debt: table 14. 
Note: DS = debt service 
EXP =exports of goods and services 
DIS = disbursements 
DBT =debt 
a
 ECLA, provisional estimates. 
* Medium and long-term or State-guaranteed loans. 
countries, including Brazil, Chile and Peru, 
have declared that they will abide by their 
present payment schedules, the likelihood is 
that they can do so only by making a signif-
icant sacrifice in terms of their economic 
growth and relying on contingency agree-
ments with IMF. 
The payments difficulties of Latin 
America are to some extent reflected in 
table 15, which presents some indicators of 
the external public debt burden in the 
region. Of course, these indicators do not 
accurately reflect the total amount of the 
debt since, for want of sufficient statistics, 
the private debt, which is considerable in 
some countries, has not been included. In 
any case, the traditional debt servicing 
coefficient, i.e., the ratio between amortiza-
tion and interest payments and export 
earnings, rose from 20% in 1977 to nearly 
30% in 1981; in addition, given the decrease 
in the value of exports shown in 1982, this 
coefficient is bound to have experienced 
another increase -and a substantial o n e - in 
this latter year. 
The debt servicing coefficient may, 
however, be misleading inasmuch as it 
suggests that the debt is paid with exports, 
when in practice it is almost always paid by 
incurring new debts. Accordingly, the ratio 
between debt servicing and new loans may 
be of use in suggesting how likely a country 
or region is to suffer an indebtedness crisis. 
This indicator has also deteriorated seriously 
in recent years in that, as may be seen in 
table 15, it climbed from 48% in 1976 to 
over 80% in 1980-1981, and, furthermore, 
another significant rise is predicted for 1982. 
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This means that Latin America is obtaining 
progressively fewer resources for investment 
and accumulation of reserves per dollar it 
receives on loan; in other words, the region 
is trapped in a vicious circle of indebtedness 
and is forced to plunge deeper and deeper 
into debt just in order to stay where it is. 
The third and fourth indicators of the 
external debt burden —public debt and 
global debt as a percentage of exports- have 
also shown a tendency to increase. Normally 
these indicators would not be of much use 
for the analysis, since an increase in the 
coefficient would not necessarily mean that 
the situation was any worse if loan re-
payment periods were also extended. How-
ever, the information available suggests that 
on average repayment periods have tended to 
be shorter, so that the rise in these 
coefficients also points to potential external 
indebtedness problems. 
One 1 ast indicator of indebtedness 
difficulties and of the balance-of-payments 
situation in general is the large number of 
countries in the region which have managed 
to obtain financing from IMF (see table 16). 
This, circumstance is attributable to two 
factors. First, the commercial banks have 
been unwilling to reschedule debts or to 
grant new credit to countries with payments 
difficulties unless they have previously 
reached a financing agreement with IMF; 
secondly, IMF may have become more 
attractive as a source of credit owing to the 
recent modifications in the terms of its loans 
and to the expansion of its financing pro-
grammes outside the sphere of the terms in 
question. 
2. The origins of the problem 
(a) The international recession 
One of the origins of the problem is to 
be found in the international recession, 
which, as noted above, has been unusually 
long drawn-out. In practice, the recession in 
the industrial countries has reduced the 
aggregate demand of the central countries 
and, consequently, has brought down the 
price of Latin American exports; and to 
make matters worse, the developing coun-
tries have sought to offset the drop in prices 
by exporting larger volumes, a move which 
produces an even greater glut on the market 
and lowers prices in its turn. Here again, the 
countries as a whole must step up their 
efforts simply to remain in statu quo. In 
any case, the recession has an eroding effect 
on what looks like a means of paying off 
the debt (i.e., exports) and affects the 
banks' opinion of the solvency of countries, 
to the detriment of the real source of 
payment, i.e., loans granted on reasonable 
terms. 
(b) The high cost of credit 
All the indicators suggest that the terms 
on which Latin America contracts its debts 
have reached a point where new loans barely 
provide minimum relief from the burden of 
indebtedness. 
Thus figure 6 shows that interest rates 
have become very positive in real terms in 
the past two years, after having been neg-
ative, also in real terms, ever since the 
mid-1970s. The Bank for International 
Settlements, for example, has reported that in 
the period March-June 1982 interest rates in 
the United States were over 7%, in contrast 
with the more normal real rates of 2% which 
prevailed in the 1960s. 
However, from the point of view of the 
debtor countries, the high interest rates must 
primarily be considered in relation to the 
prices of the region's exports. It can then be 
seen that the real cost of credit for Latin 
America increased spectacularly between 
1981 and 1982, since the LIBOR rate rose 
unusually high while, at the same time, there 
was a sharp drop in export prices (see figure 
6). This clearly shows the extent of the 
deterioration in the region's external debt-
servicing capacity due to exogenous factors. 
The available data also show that the 
effect of the high basic interest rates in 
1982 has been even further aggravated by 
the rise in the variable component of 
interest on loans in Eurocurrencies to devel-
oping countries, which, in turn, reflects the 
greater risk run by the banks in lending 
money to the countries n^ question. 
The negative effect of the high basic 
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Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN FINANCIAL RESOURCES PROVIDED 
BY THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND DURING 1982 
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PartB: ECLA, on the basis of data provided by its Information Service. 
Note: Compensatory Financing Facility: by means of this facility, IMF provides immediate financing to countries whose 
balance of payments has deteriorated as a result of declines in the prices of their staple export products. 
Stand-by arrangements: under these arrangements, IMF supports government economic adjustment programmes 
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interest rates is, moreover, two-fold in that 
they increase not only the cost of new loans 
but also that of loans previously contracted 
at variable interest, which have increased 
notably in Latin America since the beginning 
of the 1970s. 
The recent interest-rate trends have 
thus given rise to a new phenomenon -that 
of interest rates being a debt burden in 
themselves. Thus, it is estimated that in 
1982 interest payments amounted to the 
equivalent of about 50% of export earnings 
in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, while the 
corresponding figure for Mexico was 44%. 
The second cause of the increase in the 
cost of indebtedness has to do with the 
evolution of the average time in which the 
loans mature. Even in the absence of 
complete data on debt repayment periods 
for 1982, it seems likely, to judge by trends 
in the preceding year, that they were 
shorter, thus accelerating debt servicing 
payments and putting pressure on the 
countries' capacity to pay. 
It is interesting to observe that Brazil 
has opted for longer payment periods at the 
cost of accepting much bigger margins of 
interest. Because of this, its interest pay-
ments have increased to such an extent that 
they have given rise to balance-of-payments 
problems. Mexico, on the other hand, has 
accepted shorter payment periods but 
smaller margins of interest in recent years; 
consequently, the main feature of its indebt-
edness crisis has been the maturing of a large 
number of loans within very short spaces of 
time. Thus, both Brazil and Mexico have 
experienced severe debt-servicing difficulties, 
although the pressure point has been dif-
ferent in each case. 
The fact of having contracted short-
term debts is usually symptomatic of payments 
difficulties: debtors need new loans 
in order to serve their debt, while the enti-
ties granting the credits, in consideration of 
the greater risks involved, are unwilling to 
grant long-term loans. This increases short-
term lending and means that there is a 
greater accumulation of debts which have 
fallen due. 
Even though it is still difficult to 
obtain accurate data concerning short-term 
indebtedness, provisional estimates suggest 
that it amounted to 30% of Latin America's 
total debt in 1981, a figure which probably 
rose in 1982. 
The increase in short-term indebtedness, 
combined with the shorter maturities of 
medium-term instruments, means that it is 
necessary to refinance progressively larger 
proportions of the debt each year. Thus, it 
was estimated that in 1982 Mexico, Argen-
tina and Colombia would amortize close to 
50% of their indebtedness with commercial 
banks, while the comparable figure for Peru 
and Venezuela was 60%. As for Brazil, its 
explicit policy of extending the payment 
periods meant that in 1982 it had to amor-
tize only 35% of its bank debt. However, as 
has already been stated, the burden in terms 
of interest payments has already reached 
serious proportions. In addition, the tradition-
al rescheduling of amortization payments 
would scarcely relieve the country in these 
circumstances. Moreover, the greater the 
share of the debt to be paid to the banks, 
the greater their risk, which makes it even 
more difficult to obtain new loans on rea-
sonable terms. 
(c) Development strategy based on indebt-
edness 
During the 1970s, Latin America opted 
for a development strategy based on indebt-
edness. 
For a number of years the result was 
positive. Although from 1974 on the expan-
sion of the world economy was feeble, the 
economic growth of Latin America was rela-
tively brisk and considerably greater than 
that of the OECD economies. In addition, 
this strategy seemed eminently reasonable 
since indebtedness was 'cheap', with very 
low or negative real interest rates, lengthy 
payment periods and servicing payable in 
dollars, whose real value was being eroded. 
However, those who argued in favour 
of rapid entry into international capital 
markets and the concomitant strategy of 
growth based on indebtedness may have 
underestimated the real cost of credit; 
during the period nominal costs did not 
reflect the implicit risks of debt-servicing 
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problems should a conflict arise between the 
increase in liabilities with commercial banks 
and the limits set by those institutions in 
respect of their commitments. These implicit 
risks obviously became greater owing to the 
fact that the structural problems of the 
OECD c ountries caused their economic 
growth rates to fall during the 1970s (by 
comparison with those recorded in the 
preceding decade), which meant that Latin 
America had to contract even more debts in 
order to maintain its high growth rates at a 
time when general economic conditions were 
not propitious for creating the capacity to 
cope with the accumulation of the bank 
debt. 
From another point of view, the infla-
tion unleashed in the mid-1970s was unex-
pected, so that the low real cost of loans 
was a temporary and artificial phenomenon; 
once the creditors' expectations became 
more realistic, the cost of credit more than 
recovered. 
Another factor related to the strategy 
of growth based on indebtedness was that 
some countries obviously obtained more 
credit than they couid use productively, i.e., 
external loans took the place of domestic 
saving and facilitated an increase in con-
sumption, speculation and the purchase of 
weapons. 
Although much of this state of affairs 
may be attributed to erroneous indebtedness 
strategies, there can be no doubt that the 
structure of the international banking mar-
ket also helped to create the problem. In the 
initial phase of the loan cycle, the banks 
granted a large number of loans, with the 
aim of rapidly investing their surplus on 
account of competition and excess liquidity. 
However, there was often some asymmetry 
between what the banks were able to loan 
and the capacity of the countries to absorb 
the funds obtained efficiently. Thus, the 
combination of low interest rates, the pres-
tige gained by attracting international credit 
and the ease of obtaining bank loans when 
a large dollar reserve existed persuaded some 
countries to borrow more than their possi-
bilities for investment warranted and to 
postpone the making of internal adjust-
ments. 
(d) The weaknesses of the international 
financial system 
In 1974 the international banking sys-
tem became, de facto, a kind of central 
bank for the world economy. 
However, it was not in a position to 
perform this function and, at best, was able 
to assume it only for a very short time. Its 
operation was relatively satisfactory between 
1974 and 1975, when its net initial commit-
ments with the developing countries were 
still very low; today, on the other hand, in 
view of the high level of its commitments in 
the Third World, considerations attaching to 
loan risks and the need for banks to obtain 
profi ts stand in the way of efficient 
recirculation of liquidity. 
Moreover, in practice the banks do 
much to accentuate the¡ cyclical movements 
of economic activities afc both the national 
and the international ¡level. In addition, 
although in the 1970s trióse cycles were not 
closely synchronized in! the Third World, 
they are so now, owing not only to the 
prolonged OECD recession but also, and 
largely, to the lack of interest shown by the 
banks in granting new lpans, the latter being 
a factor which, as has been seen, was at one 
time decisive in stimulating the economic 
growth of the region. 
IV 
Summary and conclusions 
1. The disquieting and confused 
international scene 
As has already been pointed out, in the 
period 1980-1981 the international economy 
suffered from the greatest depression since 
the 193 0s. Unlike past recessions, the 
present one has distinctive traits which dif-
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ferentiate it clearly from anything else in 
post-war experience. In the first place, it is a 
widespread crisis which affects all the coun-
tries in the world, whether capitalist or 
socialist, developed or developing. Secondly, 
it has lasted longer, and has proved recalci-
trant to traditional therapy, which for a long 
time encouraged the supposition that appro-
priate and definitive remedies had at last 
been found to avoid, or at least to soften, 
the downturns in the economic cycle. 
The diagnosticians of the causes of the 
recession differ considerably, ranging from 
those who base their thinking on theories of 
long-term cycles and announce the advent of 
a new trough of long duration, to those who 
lay the blame on the differences between the 
large centres in respect of the growth rate of 
productivity or on the inflationary upheavals 
in the key economies of the industrial 
world. In any case the general tone is one of 
great confusion as to how to interpret the 
existing problems and of mounting insecu-
rity as to the future. 
The dominant traits of this profound 
recession in the industrialized economies are 
very familiar. In the OECD. countries the 
product remains stagnant or goes on falling; 
the extensive unemployment which already 
affects close to 32 million people persists, 
and there is not the faintest sign of its 
decreasing significantly in the medium term; 
idleness of installed capacity has increased, 
providing a disincentive for new investment; 
profits are exceptionally low, while bank-
ruptcies of enterprises are on the rise. As a 
corollary of all this, international trade de-
clined in the 1981-1982 biennium for the 
first time since 1958. In addition, the fluctu-
ations in the main currencies have added a 
new factor of instability and are responsible 
for abrupt changes in international com-
petitiveness among the various central coun-
tries and between them and the developing 
economies. 
In addition, the recession in the centres 
has spread to the entire periphery, as it was 
bound to do, in consequence of the action 
of three factors: the negative terms of trade, 
the high real interest rates and the sudden 
decline in the availability of new financial 
resources. The terms of trade have deterio-
rated mainly because of the drop in demand 
for commodities in the industrial centres, 
while the real interest rates, which are still 
at their highest level in 50 years, are attrib-
utable to the stabilization programmes which 
have promoted restrictive monetary policies 
at a time of substantial and persistent fiscal 
deficits and abrupt maladjustments in the 
exchange rates of the currencies of the leading 
industrial countries. As for new credit, it has 
grown much harder to come by as a conse-
quence of the decision on the part of the 
private international banks not to grant new 
loans, of the high levels of indebtedness of 
the Third World countries and of their 
precar ious balance-of-payments positions. 
Recently this situation has been compound-
ed by the deterioration in the quality of the 
bank portfolios of both national and interna-
tional entities. 
Meanwhile, even when forecasts predict 
that good progress will be made in the 
control of inflation and the reduction of the 
nominal interest rates, they are especially 
cautious with regard to the possibilities of 
reactivating the economic sector to a signif-
icant degree in the short run. In particular, 
stress is laid on the asymmetry in the possi-
bilities and rates of recovery in the different 
centres and doubts are expressed as to the 
time it would take for this recovery to have 
an appreciable impact on the prices of raw 
materials or on the flow of capital towards 
the developing economies (two key factors 
in the solution of the immediate problems of 
the periphery). 
For this reason, and also in considera-
tion of the high level of indebtedness of the 
majority of the Latin American countries, it 
seems wise to be prepared for a time of 
difficulties which can be got round only by 
strengthening international and regional co-
operation and by implementing domestic 
adjustment programmes in each country in 
the region. 
2. A regional economy in crisis 
As indicated above, in 1982 the Latin Amer-
ican economy became very much weaker 
and suffered its worst crisis in the past 50 
years. This crisis can certainly not be dissoci-
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ated from the profound repercussions of the 
international cycle which had some impact 
on all the countries of the region. Commen-
surately with the extent to which domestic 
policies have been mistaken in recent years, 
especially policies relating to the attraction 
and use of external credit and exchange, 
fiscal, monetary and balance-of-payments 
policies, these international repercussions 
have also shaken the countries in varying 
degrees. 
For these reasons, the regional gross 
domestic product fell by nearly 1%, and the 
per capita product decreased in all the coun-
tries of the region, while inflation markedly 
accelerated. In the external sector, the 
deficit on current account amounted to 
US$ 33 billion, and the balance of payments 
closed with a negative balance of nearly 14 
billion. These results were produced in spite 
of the fact that the trade balance closed 
with a surplus of about US$ 6 billion, by 
virtue of a painful reduction in imports. At 
the same time, there have been numerous 
cases of devaluation and international re-
serves declined in the majority of the coun-
tries of the region. 
As we have already indicated, during 
1982 Latin America was very hard hit by 
the action of external factors. Real interest 
rates, measured by the prices of the region's 
exports, reached an unprecedented level of 
close to 25%. In addition to these unfa-
vourable factors, there was a contraction in 
the net inflow of capital, which accentuated 
the effects of the cyclical drop in exports 
and the deterioration in the terms of trade. 
These phenomena have in turn had 
severe social repercussions. Thus, in the 
majority of the countries, the fall in real 
wages has been compounded by a sharp 
increase in unemployment. Moreover, the 
contraction in external and domestic 
demand and the high interest rates -both 
national and international- have had a 
marked impact on the economy at enterprise 
level, increasing the number of bankruptcies 
and, more recently, also making inroads 
into the economy of the banking institu-
tions. 
3. Trade problems 
Among the root causes of the difficulties 
now faced by both the world economy and 
the economy of Latin America are the prob-
lems of international trade, upon whose 
evolution a lasting and stable solution to the 
present recession will largely depend. In 
recent years not only has there been a sharp 
decline in the region's export earnings as a 
result of the drop in the terms of trade, but 
the protectionist trends which affect both 
the manufactures and the commodities 
exported by Latin America have intensified. 
The protectionism prevailing in the 
developed countries, which began to mani-
fest itself in new and concrete ways in the 
past decade, has not only been directly re-
sponsible for limiting the expansion and 
diversification of the exports of the develop-
ing countries but, owing to the increasingly 
broad application of protectionist measures, 
has also brought the principles and standards 
which sustain international trade into serious 
conflict with the practical realities by which 
that trade is governed. Thus, trade under 
multilateral agreements is decreasing steadily, 
and that carried out under bilateral agree-
ments contracted outside the multilateral 
agreements or simply on the basis of unilat-
eral decisions taken by the importing 
countries without regard for international 
regulations is increasing. As is easily under-
standable, therefore, the uncertainty to which 
this situation gives rise is in itself an impor-
tant limiting factor for the normal develop-
ment of international trade relations and, 
especially, for the resolution of the present 
problems with regard to the recession. 
With good reason, the recent meeting 
of GATT, which for the first time in nine 
years was held at the ministerial level and 
was attended by representatives of nearly 
100 countries from all parts of the world, 
gave rise to hopes thats¡ at the highest level 
and in accordance with the gravity of the 
world economic situation, ways would be 
found to open the gates of international 
trade and to effect a substantial improve-
ment in the prevailing trade system. 
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Unfortunately, these hopes were not 
realized. It was not possible to reach con-
crete agreements which would assure the 
developing countries that in the future the 
commitments made in their favour would be 
respected and that the practices of condi-
tional application of the most-favoured-
nation clause, discrimination, selectivity, 
unilateral compensatory measures, 'con-
trolled trade' and graduation would be pro-
gressively eliminated from international 
trade. 
It is also important to point out that at 
the Ministerial Meeting it was agreed to initi-
ate studies in the services field, which has 
vast ramifications and is of special impor-
tance for the development strategies of the 
developing countries. As specified in the 
relevant decision, the developing countries 
and competent international organizations 
must be alert and attentive to the studies 
recommended, with a view to acquiring de-
tailed knowledge of the situation with regard 
to the extensive and complex activities 
which come under the heading of services, 
so as to be able to adopt informed positions 
and ward off negative impacts on their 
balance of payments or on the autonomy of 
their national development. 
4. The imperative need for global 
solutions 
To the extent that all countries feel the 
effects of the international recession, espe-
cially those which, like the Latin American 
countries, have in recent years been more 
open to international trade and financial 
currents, the problem ceases to be an indi-
vidual or regional one and becomes a global 
problem, which also requires global solu-
tions. 
The indicators referred to in this review 
of the regional economies show that the 
Latin American countries are already en-
gaged in painful processes of internal ad-
justment. To ensure that these adjustments 
do not reach dangerous limits of social and 
political tolerance, with additional negative 
effects on the rest of the economy and on 
international finances, appropriate economic 
policies on the part of the big centres are 
needed, as well as an imaginative policy of 
international co-operation in keeping with 
the deep-seated and widespread character of 
the problems. 
In this connection, it is appropriate to 
point out that some of the recent reactions 
of the monetary authorities of the industrial-
ized countries to the payments crises of the 
developing economies seem to indicate that 
they are becoming better aware of the need 
to act promptly and with flexibility and 
imagination, especially in matters relating to 
finance and payments. In contrast, however, 
as has just been remarked, there has been no 
similar reaction in the commercial field. 
In the following paragraphs, in our 
interpretation of what in our view are the 
most urgent needs of the countries of the 
region, we shall make some observations of a 
general nature on a few of the global mea-
sures which would be desirable in the field of 
international co-operation as means for coping 
adequately with the present emergencies, 
particularly in the fields of finance and 
trade. 
(a) International reactivation 
A policy for adjusting international 
imbalances based on the principle that all 
countries must reduce their imports and 
expand their exports does not appear to be 
realistic. It would in fact make sense only in 
so far as some countries were to initiate a 
reactivation policy which would make it 
possible to absorb the greater volume of 
exports of the other countries. Obviously 
the ability to do this rests first and foremost 
with the industrial countries. It is for that 
reason that a recovery of the OECD coun-
tries would provide the relief needed for the 
countries with liquidity problems and would 
by the same token facilitate the evolution of 
those countries with structural difficulties in 
their external payments. 
In the present circumstances it is of prima-
ry importance for the big centres to come up 
with concrete policies for reactivating their 
economies without it running into new infla-
tionary excesses. In might be argued in this 
respect that single-minded, unswerving pur-
suit of the objective of avoiding inflation 
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might aggravate the trends towards recession 
and unemployment, which would constitute 
a serious threat to the political and financial 
stability of the world system. Moreover, the 
lesson learned from the Great Depression 
was that if deflation, as a measure taken 
prior to the reactivation of the economies, is 
prolonged in time, it can give rise to uncon-
trollable cumulative effects which resist indi-
rect incentives. Thus, the greater advances 
made in reducing the inflation might be 
fully outweighed by the social and political 
costs of a depression on a national and inter-
national scale. 
(b) Substantially increased mobilization of 
new financial resources 
The fact that many countries of the 
region find it necessary to devote an exces-
sively high percentage of their exports to 
servicing their debt clearly shows that they will 
not be able to repay the principal and will 
even have serious difficulties in making the 
interest payments so long as the international 
prices of exportable commodities remain low 
and high real interest rates persist. It follows 
that in order to overcome this problem there 
is need for international co-operation (on 
the part of both public and private sources) 
of a magnitude in keeping with present cir-
cumstances. 
Ever since the middle of the past 
decade, of course, private banks have been 
acting as the main agents in the extensive 
recycling of funds which was necessary in 
order to cope with the balance-of-payments 
disequilibria resulting from the increase in 
the prices of fuels. In present circumstances, 
however, private banking cannot serve effec-
tively as the moneylender of last resort. 
Considerations both of risk and of profit-
ability usually turn the banks into 'pro-
cyclical agents', rendered incapable of han-
dling the problems of the developing coun-
tries on their own-. Hence an increase in 
public financial resources would seem to be 
essential. 
In this connection, the measures aimed 
at extending the present operational facilities 
of the International Monetary Fund (by 
increasing the ordinary quotas or by ex-
tending the terms of the General Arrange-
ments to Borrow) or providing it with the 
proposed new resources (an emergency fund 
and a fund in support of interest payments) 
take on particular urgency. Nor should 
consideration fail to be given to the idea of 
ad hoc creation of Special Drawing Rights, 
as a way of independently creating liquidity 
on the part of IMF for the purpose of 
coping with the drop in international liq-
uidity and channelling new resources to alle-
viate a payments situation as tight as the 
present one. 
This is why it is of particular impor-
tance to think, as was recently advocated by 
some international monetary authorities, of 
convening a large-scale international confer-
ence to update the principles underlying the 
system of international economic relations 
established at the Bretton Woods Conference 
and to lay the foundations for a new inter-
national trade and finance organization. 
Not only is it necessary to lay claim to 
greater international resources to provide 
emergency support for countries with liq-
uidity problems, but also the flow of long-
term public capital to the developing coun-
tries should be activated in a markedly anti-
cyclical direction. Latin America has been 
repeatedly criticising the error of dras-
tically reducing the flow of public funds 
from the World Bank or IDB to the region 
on grounds that it has attracted a large 
volume of private capital in recent years. 
Experience shows that this reasoning has not 
held good for long and that today more 
than ever the region neleds additional long-
term resources, precisely to compensate for 
the sharp cutbacks in external private re-
sources and the decline in foreign invest-
ment. 
Moreover, it would be particularly 
inappropriate for the private banks, in the 
wake of the broad financial permissiveness 
which prevailed in the second half of the 
past decade, to initiate a very restrictive 
policy. In this connection, the cautionary 
observations made by the Managing Director 
of IMF to the private banking sector at the 
Toronto meeting, whenj he asked it to be 
prudent with regard to possible cutbacks in 
the resources loaned to developing regions, 
46 CEPAL REVIEW No. 191 April 1983 
seem to us to have been particularly rele-
vant. The policy that IMF agreements should 
be accompanied by private bank support is 
indispensable, not only for the viability of 
the adjustment programmes but also in the 
interests of the private system itself. 
It should be pointed out that in spite 
of the fact that a significant percentage of 
the debts contracted with international 
banks had no public guarantee, many gov-
ernments readily agreed to recognize the 
responsibility of the State in the fulfilment 
of the external commitments of the private 
sector. If account is also taken of the heavy 
profits obtained by the banks on their loans 
to developing countries in recent years and 
it is borne in mind that in their past experi-
ence , in te rna t iona l private banks have 
suffered only minor losses in recovering their 
portfolios in the region, these institutions 
might well be expected to take up positive 
attitudes towards supporting the programmes 
designed to channel new resources to the Latin 
American countries in the present conjuncture. 
(c) International machinery for re-
scheduling the debt 
It also seems obvious to us that in the 
present circumstances some international 
arrangements should be provided for sup-
plying organic and systematic relief to the 
developing countries in their debt servicing. 
The key to these arrangements is that they 
must be tied to development criteria and not 
just to repayment criteria. 
In so far as these agreements involve 
extensions to the payment of the principal 
and new credits to cope with the payment 
of interest, they do not necessarily imply a 
loss for the banks, and in many cases would 
only mean that practices agreed to by the 
banks in their own national markets would 
be reproduced at the international level. 
These arrangements are being provided 
for under the system of special agreements 
with international institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. Thus, the problem of the terms under 
which such agreements are entered into and 
the need for adapting the traditional criteria 
in that respect to the magnitude and general 
prevalence of the world recession once again 
comes to the fore. In this connection, it 
should be borne in mind that traditional 
adjustments on the expenditure side, devalu-
ations, reduction of fiscal deficits and liber-
alization of prices and interest rates, etc., 
have seldom met with success, since, in 
addition to the fact that some of the theo-
retical assumptions on which they are based 
are weak, their practical application has 
come up against eoonomic and social 
obstacles which are not always easily sur-
mounted. 
It is for this reason that in the midst of 
a world recession, in which the large majori-
ty of the developing countries are experi-
encing serious pressures in their domestic 
sectors, these adjustment policies should 
take into account the severity and general 
prevalence of the difficulties of the moment 
by trying to bring structural adjustments in 
the balance of payments and the gradual 
reduction of inflationary pressures into line 
with the maintenance of adequate rates of 
development. 
(d) Trade reform 
The stagnation of international trade 
and the deterioration of the body of rules 
and principles which should govern the inter-
national trade system represent great chal-
lenges to the developing countries and to 
their export expansion and diversification 
policies, and place serious limitations on the 
efforts to solve the region's payment prob-
lems. In connection with those problems, 
the loss of dynamism and the openness of 
world markets in the past decade is a fact of 
major significance which should be duly 
considered in the short- and even the 
medium-term development strategies of the 
Latin American countries. 
As we have repeatedly remarked, the 
problems of the past have been greatly 
aggravated in recent years by the burden of 
servicing Latin America's external debt, 
which eats up an increasingly large share of 
the income realized from exports. To 
embark on a solution to these problems 
there must be an improvement in trade, in 
which context importance again attaches to 
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such matters as the free access of Latin 
American manufactures to the markets of 
the developed countries, higher and more 
stable commodity prices and a greater degree 
of processing of primary commodities in the 
producer countries. The Latin American and 
other developing countries must pursue their 
efforts to negotiate these questions satisfac-
torily with the industrialized centres. 
In the short term, the developing coun-
tries, and those of Latin America in particu-
lar, are faced with an imperative need to 
organize their bargaining capacity in such a 
way as to keep the protectionist tendencies 
of the industrialized countries from making 
headway and embark on an effort to secure 
their elimination. Moreover, they must 
ensure that the steady deterioration in the 
standards laid down in the international 
trade system is halted, since it is harmful to 
the developing countries, and they must join 
forces with a view to moving ahead to a 
more efficient and equitable world trade 
system. 
The next session of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD VI) will provide the international 
community with a significant opportunity to 
muster the consensus needed as a point of 
departure in surmounting the obstacles in 
the way of the international trade system. 
Now is the time to define important issues 
in this regard, since in April of the current 
year it will be necessary to begin negotia-
tions for the establishment of a global sys-
tem of trade preferences among developing 
countries, which, in accordance with the 
guidelines already adopted by the Group of 
77, should lead to the creation of a real 
economic system for the developing coun-
tries. The establishment of this system will 
be a new venture, opening up vast prospects 
for the future of the developing countries in 
the concert of international economic rela-
tions. 
Furthermore, these obstacles highlight 
the need for co-operation among the devel-
oping countries and, in particular, inter-Latin 
American co-operation and integration, a 
matter to which reference is made below. 
5. Domestic policy options and the role 
of regional co-operation 
(a) The margin for manoeuvre and the 
bask orientations of domestic policy 
The foregoing comments have made 
manifest the depth of the external upheavals 
which are affecting the region and the conse-
quent need to introduce changes into the 
environment in question - a responsibility 
which is primarily incumbent upon the 
central economies and the basic institutions 
of the world system. 
The predominant importance of these 
factors, however, by no means implies that 
Latin America is completely subject to their 
influence and can therefore do nothing on 
its own account to counteract them. On the 
contrary, we believe that much can and 
must be done in this direction; not only to 
'manage' the crisis but also to palliate it 
and to create conditions which will contrib-
ute to the recovery of the Latin American 
economies. 
The present author dwelt on this 
subject at some length last year, drawing 
attention to two circumstances which are of 
vital importance. 
In the first place,, the history of the 
Great Depression of th|e 1930s —over and 
above irrelevant analogies— bears witness to 
the fact that many countries were able to 
react energetically to its traumatic effects 
and to discover appropriate means and 
policies whereby to give: impetus to a recov-
ery that in certain cases was actually steadier 
and more significant tl^ an that achieved in 
some of the industrialized countries. 
Secondly, it will not come amiss to 
repeat that the region nqw facing the present 
crucial situation has undergone substantial 
changes in the past halfjcentury, which have 
implied the expansion and diversification of 
its structures of production, the improve-
ment of the technical calibre of its profes-
sional élite, both in thp public and in the 
private sector, and the establishment of 
institutional machinery of considerable 
power and efficacy. In à word — to repeat a 
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conception that may still be considered valid 
and pertinent- there has been an increase in 
our countries' 'capacity for defence' against 
external contingencies. 
But these remarks should not be inter-
preted as an exercise in ritual optimism. 
Even if the foregoing propositions are 
upheld with full conviction, it is impossible 
to overlook the fact that in the scenario of 
today new and singularly complex situations 
can be distinguished. Cases in point are 
those already referred to in connection with 
the external debt, and those discernible 
because of the greater dependence of inter-
nal dynamism on the available supply of 
imports. And to these are added others, no 
less specific and original in relation to past 
scenarios, such as the disruptions of the 
production apparatus that have been caused 
by mistaken policies in some countries, and, 
above all, the encumbrance of a generalized 
inflationary pressure which indubitably 
militates against the possibilities of any reac-
tivation programme. 
In view of the diversity of national 
situations in these and other respects, it is 
too hazardous to make any attemp t to 
sketch out positive and universally mean-
ingful guidelines. Nevertheless, there are 
some courses of action which -in different 
versions— are taking shape in the region. 
The first seems to be the decision in 
favour of an explicit reactivation policy, 
founded on two cornerstones. One of these is 
encouragement of production for the home 
and regional markets, combined with reso-
lute export promotion to supplement this 
effort and help to maintain the level of 
imports as far as is viable. The other is the 
adoption of all the necessary and possible 
provisions to ensure that these endeavours 
are not frustrated by upsurges of inflation. 
A third requisite is that overall strategy 
should concede top priority to the relief and 
resolution of the serious social problems, in 
particular the scourge of unemployment. 
Each and all of these lines of action 
present formidable challenges, but this does 
not lessen the supreme importance of estab-
lishing a basic frame of reference for the 
policies of defence and reaction to be 
adopted. 
(b) The revitalization of regional co-opera-
tion 
Furthermore, in the present circum-
stances it is imperatively necessary to take a 
fresh and imaginative look at the possibilities 
of regional co-operation. The opportunities 
afforded by a regional market of a million 
million dollars, the steady expansion of 
intra-regional trade during the last few years, 
the manifold institutional channels existing, 
and all the methods of informal co-operation 
explored in the recent past, offer grounds on 
which to base a concentrated effort in that 
direction. 
The first step should be the urgent 
adoption of measures designed to stop the 
deterioration of the region's current terms of 
trade. Acute balance-of-payments difficulties 
often give rise to the danger of raising inter-
nal barriers to regional trade. But it is 
indispensable that medium- and long-term 
considerations and interests should prevail 
over any immediate temptation. Defence of 
regional trade is, in our view, a sine qua non 
in present circumstances. 
Secondly, attention should be turned to 
the possibility of expanding regional trade 
on the basis of the idle capacity which is on 
the increase in the region, particularly in 
industry. This might be achieved through 
government agreements concluded with the 
active participation of the private sector, 
which knows and has access to flexible and 
varied channels of interconnection. 
In this context, it becomes especially 
important to consider innovative and flexible 
financial machinery to facilitate the mobili-
zation of the real resources that are lying 
idle in the region. On other occasions 
mention has been made of the need to forge 
ahead with the study of reciprocal balance 
and credit compensation facilities and with 
the analysis of mechanisms conducive to the 
creation of a financial safety net for the 
region, and today it seems desirable to lay 
further stress on the importance which in 
the writer's view attaches to these measures. 
Furthermore, the member countries of 
the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integra-
ción (ALADI) (Latin American Integration 
Association, ex-ALALC) must in the near 
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future apply a margin of preference in re-
spect of their reciprocal trade. Maximum 
efforts should be made to ensure that this 
margin is really meaningful, for it must not be 
forgotten that the present conjuncture and 
future prospects call for more intensive and 
efficacious utilization of the regional market, 
and likewise that the eleven member countries 
have been trying for two decades to construct a 
preferential trade area. In addition, considera-
tion should be given to the possibility that this 
preference might be applicable to all the 
countries of the region. Such a measure would 
undoubtedly constitute a major incentive 
not only to the expansion and diversification 
of reciprocal trade, but also to regional 
co-operation in every guise. 
But the need to reassess the intrinsic 
merits of regional co-operation and integra-
tion is not confined to the field of trade. 
There are many areas and activities in the 
region to which a collective and concerted 
approach has been and can be adopted. In 
this connection, new and creative patterns of 
co-operation can be promoted through the 
SELA Action Committees and the mecha-
nisms of partial or multilateral scope for 
which provision is made in the 1980 
Montevideo Treaty by which ALADI was 
created. The vulnerability of the region 
which has been evidenced in this crisis of 
the world economy has led the Latin Amer-
ican countries to reach agreement, within 
the framework of SELA, on a regional 
economic safety device. The steps recently 
taken to study the specific measures that 
would set it in motion are deserving of 
special support and attention. A regional 
economic safety net should comprise specific 
action in the areas of financing and pay-
ments, food and agriculture, energy and 
trade. 
Final considerations 
A review of the economic evolution of the 
region in 1982 and the recent trends in the 
world economy suggests two considerations. 
The first is the conviction that to 
surmount the present crisis a new vision of 
the future will be required and a new system 
of international economic relations which 
will be responsive to the radical economic 
changes occurring in the world scenario, and 
which, besides making it possible to cope 
with the present emergency, will formulate 
new trade and monetary rules to facilitate 
the sustained growth of the world economy. 
Because of the indissoluble linkage between 
the region's current problems and global 
solutions, it is imperative that Latin America 
should bring the nature of its problems 
before the appropriate forums and should 
express coherent views on the global solu-
tions to which the whole world must feel 
itself committed. 
The second reflection relates to the 
medium-term view of our problems. In this 
terrain, it seems worth while to recall that 
the region faces problems of liquidity, but 
not of insolvency. The dynamism shown by 
the Latin American economy in the past 
decade, the transformation and diversifica-
tion of its production capacity and the 
abundance of its human and natural re-
sources leave no room for stultifying 
pessimism. Rather must it be considered that 
alongside their costs, crises always open up 
oportunities for making structural adjust-
ments and devising growth strategies which, 
thanks to the lessons of past experience, aim 
at achieving an economic; and social develop-
ment consonant with the expectations that 
the region may legitimately hope to see 
fulfilled. 
Lastly, as always ECLA will shoulder 
its full share of responsibility as regards 
contributing to the study and solution of 
the serious problems bpsetting the region 
today. To this end -arid in pursuit of a 
practice which has borrte valuable fruit at 
other crucial junctures in the past - the 
ECLA Secretariat has decided to convene a 
select group of Latin Anlerican personalities 
with a view to learning their views and 
proposals on the subject under discussion, 
which will have an enlightening influence on 
the institution's activities and will be of 
help in discovering the solutions for which 
our countries are clamouring today. 
